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FIRST DRAFT
Abstract
The EUROCARE study is a joint effort by European cancer epidemiologists to
measure cancer survival rates in a large sample of European countries. Its publication
over a decade ago brought some salience to the poor performance of Britain within
the European Union. The subsequent national cancer control programme initiated in
England resulted partly of that event, which suggests that, alongwith the transformative
effects of EU-level policy-making, Europeanization also occurs through the indirect
activity of epistemic communities. I provide an analytical framework that draws on
the sociology of quantification and on the politics of measurement and performance
to show how cancer control and health policy can undergo significant reforms due to
discrete and asynchronous acts of EU government.
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1 Introduction
Health systems are difficult grounds for the European Union to develop a full-fledged man-
date, especially when it comes to health system funding or services and staff regulation.
Even when EU law ends up, after tiresome political struggles, eventually affecting the core
functioning of health systems, their implementation is subject to complex domestic arrange-
ments and renewed political conflict.1 Still, health systems and policies show some form of
“chaordic” integration.2 Empirically, then, the authority of the European Union (whether
legally binding or not) over health remains an empirical puzzle, and a conceptual one for
all scholars concerned with Europeanization as a political process of “legal, economic, and
cultural territorial de-differentiation”.3
Recent perspectives in that field of inquiry suggest that theorising and conceptualis-
ing Europeanization will require, in the future, that we move even further away from neo-
functionalism than we already have, in order to capture some of the more subtle processes
at play behind the salient effects of EU institutions; “ It can be useful as a corrective to this
bias to think of the processes of policy adjustment in other international arenas and epis-
temic communities; these are much more horizontal and not without suitable, more generic,
conceptual apparatus.”4 In what follows, I follow that suggestion and focus on the transfor-
mative effects brought to a domestic policy environment by an epistemic community5 of
European cancer epidemiologists; this community has only loose ties to EU institutions, but
its activity has translated into policy changes that strongly relate to the general direction of
health care and public health at the European level.
The following introductory paragraphs set out the outline of the argument and the meth-
ods used to collect the empirical data; the next sections offer a narrative of the case study and
a possible theorisation to support its findings; the paper concludes on some general remarks
about the scope and potential generalisation of the results.
1. Scott L. Greer, The Politics of European Union Health Policies. Making European Health Policy in Ger-
many, France, Spain and the United Kingdom (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2009).
2. Wolfram Lamping and Monika Steffen, \European Union and Health Policy: The “Chaordic” Dynamics
of Integration," Social Science Quarterly 90, no. 5 (2009): 1361{1379.
3. Stefano Bartolini, Restructuring Europe. Centre Formation, System Building and Political Structuring
between the Nation-State and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), xii.
4. Simon Bulmer, \Theorizing Europeanization," in Europeanization. New Research Agendas (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 56.
5. The notion designates “a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particu-
lar domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area. Although
an epistemic community may consist of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have
(1) a shared set or normative and principled beliefs… (2) shared causal beliefs… (3) shared notions of validity…
and (4) a common policy enterprise – that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to
which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be
enhanced as a consequence.” (Peter M. Haas, \Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,"
International Organization 46, no. 1 (1992): 3).
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1.1 Outline of the argument
In this paper, I show how the European Union acquired an effective influence in cancer
control, and more specifically in cancer control performance, which had consequences for
domestic health systems and public health policies at large. As I explain in Section 2, EU
involvement to the “fight against cancer” was initially marked by a soft-law overtone, which
still bore important consequences in some branches of cancer control, such as tobacco pol-
icy.6 However, as I show by focusing on one seemingly ‘harmless’ items of that approach,
the EUROCARE epidemiological study, the European Union has had a more general ef-
fect on cancer control by forcing at least two Member States – Denmark and the UK – to
adopt national cancer control programmes that have deeply affected the health systems and
policies of these countries.
I leave Denmark aside in the remainder of this paper and will focus on the UK, and on
England more specifically, in Section 3.7 I then offer, in Section 4, a complete analytical
framework to gain a precise understanding of the mechanisms that underlie this indirect and
perhaps uncommon process of Europeanization.
My intention with this paper is to refine current approaches of Europeanization by ex-
ploring a parallel track to legal and institutional reform, by showing how EU-level ‘knowl-
edge initiatives’ like the EUROCARE study can have a substantive effect on domestic policy
environments, even when the formal involvement of EU actors is residual and the influence
of EU institutions tenuous (at best), as in the case of the EUROCARE study. I have tried to
delineate as precisely as possible what I have observed about the EUROCARE, as to pro-
vide a full-fledged empirical exemplar for what I end up calling ‘disciplinary acts of EU
comparison.’ The logic of these acts might be relatively trivial, but I believe they deserve
more observational attention and a stronger theoretical foundation. In that task, I draw on
a large literature taken from political science as well as organizational theory and from the
sociology of quantification.
6. The influence of the European Union on tobacco control policies is the subject of an large literature; see
especially Tamara K. Hervey and Jean V.McHale,Health law and the European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), 368-384; Francesco Duina and Paulette Kurzer, \Smoke in Your Eyes: The Struggle
over Tobacco Control in the European Union," Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 1 (2004): 57{77;
Sebastiaan Princen, \Advocacy Coalitions and the Internationalization of Public Health Policies," Journal of
Public Policy 27, no. 1 (2007): 13{33; Hadii M. Mamudu and Donley T. Studlar, \Multilevel Governance and
Shared Sovereignty: European Union, Member States, and the FCTC," Governance 22, no. 1 (2009): 73{97.
7. Second-hand evidence that Denmark was affected by the EUROCARE, for the same reasons as the UK
was, appears in Michael O. Appel, Cancer Plan, 5-2005, Health Policy Monitor (Berlin: Bertelsmann-Stiftung,
2005). I have not empirically researched the case further (yet).
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1.2 Methods
The paper fits into a larger inquiry of national cancer control programmes in England and
France, which I examine from two policy perspectives (agenda-setting and institutional au-
tonomy). I intend to set out a theoretical framework to understand why states become con-
cerned with the disease constituency formed by cancer sufferers, how does cancer control
become elevated onto the governmental agenda, and what makes national cancer control
programmes distinct within the larger policy domains of health care and public health. I
focus on the empirical case of England, although similar policy initiatives are observable in
the devolved British governments and health administrations.8
The argument offered is a low-resolution one of mostly theoretical texture, and what is
left of speculation in my analysis is to be tested against additional interviews in the com-
ing months. I also hope to lose some abstraction in the final draft, as well as adjust some
of the empirics: my sources rarely conflict frontally on the narrative, but some of them
do not triangulate so to speak. The sources are limited to publicly available publications
from general media and specialised outlets (mostly medical journals). I have also started
to collect interviews with key stakeholders, always as face-to-face interactions, and either
as formal meetings or through common attendance at scientific conferences and symposia.
The twelve-or-so interviews that I have collected with regards to the present issue show no
major discrepancy between the public and ‘offstage’ transcripts of the narrative. Additional
information was also acquired through email from researchers in Italy, France and the UK.
2 Background
2.1 Cancer Control in EU Programmes
The European Union (EU) has been fairly involved in shaping the cancer control policies
as soon as the European Councils in Milan and Luxembourg of June and December 1985,
when it recognized cancer as a priority within its public health agenda.9 The overall EU
health mandate has evolved since that date;10 however, themodus operandi of the European
Union within the cancer policy domain has stayed remarkably stable: from 1987 to 2002,
8. Devolved health polities in the UK would require a different research framework that would account for
at least three dimensions: the territorial politics of health policy in post-devolution Britain; the policy diffu-
sion effects between England on the one hand and Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales on the other; and the
supranational influence of EUROCARE and other potential factors in these territories. A lot of Scott Greer’s
research could be used in assembling such a framework, which I intend to do in a later research project.
9. Just as ‘public health’ and ‘health care’ overlap and are notoriously difficult to map precisely, ‘cancer
control’ designates a wide gamut of activities that span over several medical disciplines, practices and health
policies.
10. See Hervey and McHale, Health law and the European Union for a thorough history.
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three “Europe Against Cancer” (EAC) action programmes were launched, largely under the
influence of two French and Italian oncologists, and in the aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl
disaster.11 All programmes, which differ only in their (modest) budgets and in the emphasis
set on each of their components, have aimed at improving cancer prevention (including
important initiatives in tobacco control), scientific information and public awareness, and
medical training.
The successive EACprogrammeswere subsumed in an overarching ‘public health frame-
work’ from 2003 to 2008.12. Recently, the European Union’s specific interest in cancer con-
trol was revived with the launch of the 2009–13 “European Partnership Against Cancer”
(EPAC) initiative,13. The sum-total of EU cancer-specific programmes (shown in Fig. 1)
reflects sustained attention from, and broadly consensual decision-making between, EU in-
stitutions. The mandate they have shaped for EU involvement into cancer control has not
dramatically evolved over time in the way that other branches of EU health policy-making
have, such as EU involvement in health systems policy.14 The most substantial change in
EU cancer control policies occurred with the third EAC, which drew from the then recent
Article 129 EC (now Article 152 EC) introduced into the Treaty of Rome at Maastricht in
1992. Making extensive use of the language of “health protection,” the third EAC offered to
develop quality assurance and control for cancer prevention, which led to the Council adopt-
ing a Recommendation on cancer screening in December 2003; more recently, the European
Commission has published “European guidelines for quality assurance in breast and cervical
cancer screening and diagnosis,” as well as an Implementation Report in December 2008.15
None of these soft-law, benchmarking initiatives has been particularly controversial16
11. See Louise G. Trubek, Mark Nance, and Tamara K. Hervey, \The Construction of Healthier Europe:
Lessons from the Fight Against Cancer," Wisconsin International Law Journal 26, no. 3 (2008): 868{907 for
a synthetic overview of how the EAC programmes were born, and Hervey and McHale, Health law and the
European Union, 368-374 on how they developed, with particular reference to tobacco control. At some point
in his recently published memoirs, French oncologist Maurice Tubiana offers a slightly different narrative for
the genesis of the EAC initiatives: apparently, after an unsuccessful attempt at getting a national cancer plan
from the French health minister in the early 1980s, Tubiana decided to go venue-shopping and, in his own
words, ‘went to the European Commission’ (confirmed by interview data obtained on April 7, 2008). In both
scenarii, the personal influence of oncologists is unavoidable; the importance of the Chernobyl disaster as a
focusing event in the agenda-setting pattern is also undeniable, as the first EAC programme was launched only
four months after the incident, by a Resolution of the Council adopted on July 7, 1986; the European Parliament
delivered its opinion even sooner after the disaster, on May 12, 1986 (OJ 1986 184/19).
12. Decision 1786/2002/EC adopting the new public health framework, (OJ 2002 L271/1); cited by ibid.,
373.
13. “Working together to fight cancer- President Barroso and Commissioner Vassiliou launch the European
Partnership for Action against Cancer,” EC Press Release IP/09/1380, 29 September 2009.
14. Scott L. Greer, \Choosing Paths in European Union Health Services Policy: A Political Analysis of a
Critical Juncture," Journal of European Social Policy 18, no. 3 (2008): 219{231.
15. Council Recommendation of 2 December 2003 on cancer screening (2003/878/EC); Commission Report
on the implementation of the Council Recommendation on cancer screening (COM(2008)882); see the European
Commission website, “Key Documents in Genetics and screening” section.
16. Neither have they produced dramatic effects, by that matter: population-based screening programmes
remain patchy in 5 to 12 Members States depending on tumour type; see “Europe needs to intensify and double
cancer screening, concludes Commission report,” EC Press Release IP/09/113, 22 January 2009.
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Figure 1: EU cancer-specific programmes, 1987–2013.
Year
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
EAC-1
EAC-2
EAC-3
EPAC-1
2.2 The EUROCARE cancer knowledge initiative
A common characteristic of all EU cancer-specific programmes lies in the funding of EU-
wide ‘knowledge initiatives’ dedicated to cancer, by which I designate the vast research
effort deployed by epidemiologists and cancer specialists in virtually all European Mem-
ber States to gain a precise understanding of cancer as a disease and of cancer incidence,
prevalence, mortality and survival within the borders of the EuropeanUnion (and sometimes
beyond these borders). The EUROCARE study was part of these projects,17 and has been
funded through a string of European research grants, such as the European Union BIOMED
and FP4 programmes.
EUROCARE stands for European Cancer Registry-based study on survival and care of
cancer patients. Its main investigators define it as “a cancer epidemiology research project
on survival of European cancer patients.” The project was established in 1989 as a collab-
orative effort between two Italian research centres, and then expanded to include as many
population-based cancer registries as possible, from as many European countries as possi-
ble, depending on incidence and survival data availability.”18 Its four completed waves are
based on epidemiological cohorts of cancer patients diagnosed between 1978 and 2002, and
its next edition (“EUROCARE-5”) aims at providing data for patients diagnosed up to 2007.
By accretion, the EUROCARE studies have produced a very detailed picture of cancer sur-
vival in Europe for patients diagnosed over two decades (as shown in Fig. 2), and will soon
cover three decades of cancer survival in European countries.
There is little doubt that EUROCARE is one of, if not the most, prominent study in
cancer epidemiology in the past decade. The publication output of the study reaches slightly
over 90 papers (including several IARC monographs19), sometimes co-authored by more
17. A list of the plethoric cancer research initiatives that received financial support of the European Union is
available on the European Commission’s website, “Major and chronic diseases: Cancer” section.
18. EUROCARE website, “About Us” section. At this date, the membership has expanded to 83 European
cancer registries in 21 countries.
19. The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) is an agency created at arm’s length of the
World Health Organisation in 1962. The Agency intends to be an authoritative source of knowledge on the
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Figure 2: EUROCARE coverage of diagnosed cancer patients, 1978–2002.
Year
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
EUROCARE-1
EUROCARE-2
EUROCARE-3
EUROCARE-4
than 150 scientists, in high-profile medical journals specialised in cancer research20. These
publications have, in turn, attracted citations from other articles.21
The intended effect of the EUROCARE study was to provide information on cancer
survival in Europe, as well as to “help health authorities to make informed decisions regard-
ing the most effective investment of resources.” As its long-term goals, the study seeks to
“reduce inequalities in cancer care and survival across Europe, increase standards of cancer
care in Europe,22 and provide information that is useful for health planners, doctors and
citizens as well.”23 The task of the group was hence meant to be state-enabling, rather than
state-ranking. However, the EUROCARE publications did link cancer survival to health
system performance, and also suggested, in its second edition, that “it may be of interest to
compare the ranking of the age-adjusted survival estimates for the 17 European countries in-
cluded in the study with that of the usual economic indicators of gross domestic product and
health expenditure.”24 Five years later, following the third edition of EUROCARE, the com-
parison was actually performed and published in a supplement to the Annals of Oncology.25
The results of that comparison carried a very important policy implication, with the authors
causes of human cancer, on carcinogenesis and on the worldwide spread of cancer. It also develops evidence-
based strategies for cancer prevention and control.
20. The primary targets have been the European Journal of Cancer, the Lancet Oncology, the International
Journal of Cancer and the Annals of Oncology, all of which are very reputed outlets in cancer epidemiology.
For a small sample of EUROCARE 1–4 publications, see Franco Berrino et al., eds., Survival of Cancer Patients
in Europe: The EUROCARE Study (Lyon: IARC, IARC Press, 1995); Franco Berrino et al., \Introduction: The
EUROCARE II Study," European Journal of Cancer 34, no. 14 (1998): 2139{2153; Michel P. Coleman et al.,
\EUROCARE-3 Summary: Cancer Survival in Europe at the End of the 20th Century," Annals of Oncology
14 Suppl 5 (2003): v128{49; Milena Sant et al., \EUROCARE-4. Survival of Cancer Patients Diagnosed in
1995–1999. Results and Commentary," European Journal of Cancer 45, no. 6 (2009): 931{991.
21. For instance, The Lancet, a medical journal of high readership and reputation, published 34 articles and
news items on EUROCARE during the 2000–2010 decade.
22. This aim is justified by data showing that standards can effectively improve survival rates; see Mark
McCarthy et al., \Would Compliance with Cancer Care Standards Improve Survival for Breast, Colorectal and
Lung Cancers?" Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 62, no. 7 (2008): 650{654.
23. EUROCARE website, “EUROCARE-5” section; IARC Press Release 129, 22 September 2009. Identical
statements are made in several EUROCARE publications.
24. Berrino et al., \Introduction: The EUROCARE II Study," 2152.
25. Andrea Micheli et al., \European Health Systems and Cancer Care," Annals of Oncology 14 Suppl 5
(2003): v41{v60.
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concluding: “cancer survival depends on the widespread application of effective diagnosis
and treatment modalities, but our enquiry suggests that the availability of these depends on
macro-economic determinants, including health and public health investment.”.26
The perhaps less intended effect of the study was to provide a comparative ranking
that was then to be used as an authoritative benchmark for the objective quality of cancer
care in the surveyed countries. Generally speaking, rankings produce an uncompromisingly
forthright objectivation of a raw hierarchy, showing the crude variations that exist between
categorically and geographically close units, such as hospitals, universities or, when com-
parison is drawn on national statistics, countries.27 Rankings health units is rather common
and can form either routine news items, as in the case of rankings among health authorities
in Britain, or very salient items on public agendas, as in the case of the WHO 2000 ranking
of health systems (in which France arrived 1st and Britain 18th).
On the face of it, the EUROCARE results did not differ much from other rankings based
on global health indicators, such as infant mortality or life expectancy. Two distinctions be-
tween previous comparative health data and the EUROCARE data can still be drawn. First,
the EUROCARE data were perceived as the first “internationally comparable health out-
come measures” to provide an effective measure of quality of care rather than the broader
set of social conditions that influence life expectancy andmortality.28 Second, EUROCARE
was disease-specific, and it focused on a particularly dreaded disease, which has been re-
peatedly framed as a ‘modern plague’ at the centre of many medical-military analogies.29
The combination of both characteristics explains the sudden outrage that occurred in
Britain by the publication of the EUROCARE results: when a ranking provides precise
information where only latent approximations existed, the ‘revelation effect’ of a precise
ordering can be quite ravaging to the units sitting at its bottom if the ranking offers a direct
assessment of survival to one of the most feared forms of modern illness.
26. Micheli et al., \European Health Systems and Cancer Care," v41. This publications postdates the UK
narrative developed in the next section, even though the British elites seem to have arrived to the same conclusion
on their own.
27. For illustrative purposes, think of an extreme example, such as a ranking of U.S. states by jail sentence
length among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. Even though the
U.S. Constitution requires that these variations be avoided, they exist nonetheless. A ranking of all states from
least to most severe would probably have some crude effects on its readers.
28. Clive Smee, Speaking Truth to Power (Oxford: Radcliffe, 2005), 23. Smee remarks that the UK was an
‘average OECD country’ according to these previous indicators.
29. The work of Susan Sontag and others, such as James Patterson or Patrice Pinell, illustrate both the ‘plague’
and ‘war’ statements. In that respect, cancer figures, with obesity, on the list of ‘noncommunicable epidemics’
that are being socially constructed (and taken action against) by a large issue network at the global scale.
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3 Narrative
As it happens, in the EUROCARE-2 rankings, the UK appeared to be remarkably outper-
formed by all immediate neighbour Western states, and even by some Eastern European
ones. As shown in Fig. 3, some presentations of the EUROCARE-2 data ordered the 17
covered countries from highest to lowest cancer survival rates, which clearly revealed the
detrimental position of England and Scotland; the same presentations also computed the risk
ratio of each country against the European average, showing the countries with the worst
risk ratios in a darker colour.
In some other EUROCARE-2 publications, the graphical explicitness was replaced by
textual descriptions that also pointed the UK as underperforming other Western countries,
by classifying it along with Eastern European countries in a ‘family of nations’ exercise.
The EUROCARE-2 breast cancer results hence read:
The age-standardised 1- and 5-year relative survival results… indicate that the
countries fell into four broad groups:
(1) Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, France and Italy all had both 1- and
5-year survival above the European average;
(2) Denmark, The Netherlands, Germany and Spain had both 1- and 5-year
survival close to the European average;
(3) Scotland, England and Slovenia had 1-year survival some 3–4% below the
average, and 5-year survival 6–9% below; and
(4) Slovakia, Poland and Estonia had 1-year survival 6–8% below the average,
and 5-year survival 13–15% below.30
The EUROCARE-2 data showed that the UK had low survival rates overall, if not the
worst, as in the case of 1-year survival rates for lung cancer among males and females.
England and Scotland were not the only Western countries to figure at the bottom of the
EUROCARE-2 league tables: Denmark was also lowly ranked, as Austria was for 5-year
survival among breast cancer patients. But in the case of the UK, all common tumour sites
(colorectal, breast, lung, prostate and ovarian cancers) reflected the dismal picture of the
UK systematically doing worse than the European average.31
Faced with these results and dim prospects for cancer patients, all common actors in
the UK health policy community reacted to the EUROCARE study. The media made it
30. Mike J. Quinn et al., \Variations in Survival from Breast Cancer in Europe by Age and Country,
1978–1989," European Journal of Cancer 34, no. 14 (1998): 2206, my emphasis.
31. To be fair, the UK was only quasi-systematically doing worse than EU average, as it was actually doing
better on 7 out of the 25 studied cancers.
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Figure 3: EUROCARE-2 results for colorectal cancer, both sexes, all ages.
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sound both catastrophic and predictable, while some health professionals objected to the
relevance of the data; and finally, at the political level, office-holders tried to avoid the
blame by enacting a national cancer control programme along with other significant and
heavily publicised health policies. I cover each segment of that sequence in what follows.
3.1 Health policy and media framing at the time of EUROCARE publication
The EUROCARE-2 results were published in December 1998, just in time for the British
media to cover them as part of their larger NHS stories agenda in 1999, a year that should be
considered as the annus horribilis of the NHS under newly elected NewLabour. In 1997, the
party had pledged to “saving the NHS” as well as tackling health inequalities by fighting the
causes of poor health; the particular case of reducing waiting times for breast cancer surgery
was also mentioned in the party manifesto. Yet, in the first two years of their mandate,
Blair and Brown had also pledged to stick with the public health expenditure set by their
Conservative predecessors, as to savemoney for their next budgeting round (Comprehensive
Spending Review). In these circumstances, health media coverage was largely dominated
by news on how the government was not delivering any part of its electoral agenda on the
NHS: in effect, expenditure did increase more than expected in that period, whereas low
specialist provision and long waiting times were brandished as (ambiguous) performance
measures showing a deterioration in NHS services. As a result, “as so often in its history,
the NHS appeared to be on the point to collapse” and “left only three national dailies (the
Guardian, Financial Times and Mirror) still believing a tax-funded health service was the
most efficient by the Autumn of 1999… The BBC had an ‘NHS crisis’ logo running above
its NHS bad news stories.”32
In that context, the publication of the EUROCARE results made a particularly effective
impact within the British media because it resonated with several common and accepted
frames about the NHS–in a nutshell, that it is excessively rationed, plagued by red tape,
and generally subpar. The low reputational capital of the NHS is paradoxical if considered
next to the public’s attachment to keeping it public, but it is a reality that the NHS is and
has been perceived, over at least two decades, by individuals as well as by (some) popular
media, as dysfunctional, underperforming and hardly trustworthy.33 Every round of EURO-
32. Rudolf Klein, The New Politics of the NHS. From Creation to Reinvention, 5th ed. (Oxford: Radcliffe
Publishing, 2006), 201; Malcolm Dean, \Media Fingers in the Social Policy Pie – and the Seven Sins of the
Reptiles" (15thGuardian Lecture, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, 2008), 13. The sentiment at the time
was confirmed by post hoc rationalisations of the NHS crisis on the next year, such as Derek Wanless’ report
or the IEA’s 2000 report Delay, Denial and Dilution, which focused on heart disease and cancer and made very
extensive use of the EUROCARE data.
33. For a precise analysis, see Peter Taylor-Gooby and Andrew Wallace, \Public Values and Public Trust:
Responses to Welfare State Reform in the UK," Journal of Social Policy 38, no. 3 (2009): 402. Interestingly,
there is an additional negativity bias about what people believe other people believe about the NHS: whereas
everyone seems to agree that public opinion about the NHS is dramatically low in Britain, polling data do not
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CARE data can be read to echo this common wisdom: that the NHS is under-performing in
delivering quality health services to all of its patient constituencies. More specifically, the
EUROCARE data articulated gracefully with two dominant themes of NHS politics:
The plights of health rationing (1): Funding Endemic to the NHS is the idea that its
funding allocation is insufficient to its task. The resulting rationing measures can be spec-
tacular, especially if doctors bandwagon with the media to denounce them, as they did on
November 9, 1999, when several physicians reported having lying to terminally ill cancer
patients about the availability of cancer treatments).34 Earlier that year, on February 4, the
EUROCARE results had been put on show at the International Congress on Anti-Cancer
Treatment in Paris, where oncologist and WHO consultant Herbert Pinedo had pointed
out that health funding across Europe was ‘inadequate’ in many countries, as it limited
the number of trained oncologists and the availability of anticancer drugs.35 British me-
dia extensively covered the conference, with tabloids calling the UK’s record ‘appalling’
and ‘shameful.’36 Throughout the year, the news cycle continued to pick up on the same
EUROCARE-2 evidence as different journalists picked up quotes and articles from differ-
ent sources, all which emphasised low spending as a possible cause for low cancer survival
rates.37 Later on in 1999, oncologists were also leading the ‘Campaign for Effective and
Rational Treatment’ (Cert, which was immediately backed by the All-Party Parliamentary
Cancer Group) into lobbying directly for a $170/year increase in health expenditure, based
on the low availability of cancer drugs in the UK.38
The plights of health rationing (2): Waiting times Equally endemic to the NHS is
the idea that long waiting times, as experienced in Beveridgian health systems, can have dra-
matic consequences. In 1999, not only did speculations over the causes of the EUROCARE-
2 results feed into that mindset, but scientific data came to support the hypothesis that waits
reflect such a bleak picture. In fact, in 1999, satisfaction with the NHS was under 35% according to the British
Social Attitudes survey, a historical low in at least a decade (Tony Delamothe, \How the NHS Measures up,"
British Medical Journal 336, no. 7659 (2008): 1469{1471).
34. Jenny Hope, “Our cancer disgrace. Top specialists confess: We have to lie to patients,” Daily Mail, 9
November 1999.
35. Emily Wilson, “Cancer cuts that kill; Britain spends less on drugs and its patients are paying with their
lives,” Daily Mail, 5 February 1999; Jennifer Trueland and Nick Thorpe, “UK lags in cancer treatment,” The
Scotsman, 5 February 1999.
36. See, e.g., Lisa Reynolds, “Pattie blasts UK’s ‘appalling’ record” and “We’re worst at beating cancer,” The
Sun, 5 February 1999.
37. See, e.g. Sarah Boseley, “Cancer ‘killing toomany’ in UK,” The Guardian, and Jeremy Laurance, “Britain
lags in treating cancer,” The Independent, both published on 10 March 1999 following Karol Sikora’s editorial
in the European Journal of Cancer.
38. Sarah Boseley, “Extra $170m a year urged for cancer drugs,” The Guardian, 5 May 1999; Cherry Norton,
“Cancer cash should be doubled, specialists say,” The Independent, 5 May 1999. One oncologist illustrated
the seriousness of the crisis by declaring: “For the first time it may be possible to get better care in the private
sector” (Jill Palmer, “Cancer drug cash scandal,”Mirror, 5 May 1999).
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induced delayed detection and therefore lower chances of effective treatment.39 The threat
posed to patients by waiting times was exposed even more critically in the first semester of
2000 with the dramatic case of Mavis Skeet, a throat cancer patient whose condition dete-
riorated until the point of no return while she was waiting for a surgical operation that had
been delayed four times due to shortages in beds following an influenza epidemic in the the
winter months.40
Health and geographical inequalities Finally, the NHS is constantly under attack for
treating its patients differently depending on either arbitrary and/or unfair criteria. After it
had been shown that Britain was doing worse than the rest of Europe on cancer survival,
it came as an additional issue that health inequalities were also remarkably steep within
the population, following the wealth gradient.41 Next to income inequalities, geographical
inequalities were also under attack, with news stories denouncing the infamous ‘postcode
lottery’ of NHS treatment.42
From that cursory assessment, then, the EUROCARE results provided at least three
additional lines to the litany of health scandals in the UK, by showing how constrained
spending and long waits could kill, and how the least well-off were suffering even more
from it.
In the midst of that storm of criticism, many players in the health care arena piggybacked
correct term? on the EUROCARE results to push their personal reform agendas: several
health interest groups, including principally individual clinicians or third-sector organisa-
tions, took the results as an opportunity to call for additional NHS funding and an increase
in specialist training;43 cancer charities, such as the Cancer Research Campaign, also had
an obvious vested interest in publicising the results as to encourage donations and increase
public awareness of cancer symptoms and prevention measures. As of today, the EURO-
CARE results are still being summoned by clinicians either to set the agenda on a particular
form of cancer, such as childhood cancer, or on some aspects of cancer treatment, such as
multidisciplinary teams.44
39. Sarah Boseley, “Delays that kill victims of breast cancer,” The Guardian, 2 April 1999.
40. Cherry Norton and Ian Herbert, “Urgent cancer operations delayed by epidemic”, The Independent, 12
January 2000; “Cancer patient dies after four surgery delays,” The Guardian, 2 June 2000.
41. Sarah Boseley, “Cancer survival linked to wealth,” The Guardian, 23 April 1999; Ian Murray, “Poor have
less chance of beating cancer,” The Times, 23 April 1999; Anthony Browne, “Britain fails in war on disease,”
The Guardian, 17 October 1999.
42. See Hilary Bungay, \Cancer and Health Policy: The Postcode Lottery of Care," Social Policy & Adminis-
tration 39, no. 1 (2005): 35{48. There is a logical fallacy in considering that a lottery is necessarily undemocratic
and/or unfair, but that is beyond the scope of the argument.
43. See, for instance, Karol Sikora, \Cancer survival in Britain is poorer than that of her comparable European
neighbours," British Medical Journal 319, no. 7208 (1999): 461{462. Many letters and editorials followed.
44. See, respectively, Alan W. Craft and Kathy Pritchard-Jones, \UK Childhood Cancer Survival Falling be-
hind Rest of EU?" Lancet Oncology 8, no. 8 (2007): 662{663 and Martin H. N. Tattersall, \Multidisciplinary
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Had the positional status (standing) of the NHS been that of a ‘top-tier’ health system, or
even ‘the best one in the world,’ as many Frenchmen like to present their own system, then
perhaps would the EUROCARE study have been challenged more fiercely and met with
additional layers of skepticism in the media and general public, or even downplayed and
eventually ignored. Instead, the frame set by the EUROCARE results was consonant with
hearsay about the flawed and faulty nature of the UK health system as a whole, which meant
there was little for journalists to add to the story to make it sound credible (an exemplar of
quasi nihil novi sol solum as a proxy for truth). Moreover, the journalistic preferred practice
of ‘having two sides to every story’ could be easily applied, as several health professionals
publicly objected to the validity of the EUROCARE study.
3.2 Identity threats and defensive work among health professionals
Even if the media could easily identify several clinical and public health specialists to cor-
roborate the EUROCARE results, early reactions to the study among health professionals
in England also reflected a standard defence mechanism to rankings and other performance
measures. Rankings are generally suspected to be value-laden in their design, and to be
methodologically flawed in a way or another. Such suspicion is particularly observable
among the institutions that perceive a given ranking as an identity threat, i.e. as a potential
attack on their core identity attributes.
In the case of the UK health system, “free access to health care at the point of delivery”
and public taxation as a means of financing have been among the defining characteristics
of the NHS since the creation of the Service. Also relevant would be the organisation of
British primary care, which emphasises the gatekeeping role of general practitioners and
differs markedly from Bismarckian health systems such as France before its 2004 public
health reform. These characteristics might well be threatened by the EUROCARE results,
since the main explanations advanced in current medical debates on variations in cancer sur-
vival concern diagnostic capacity and early detection, as well as drug availability. The first
two factors especially are perceived as crucial determinants in 1-year survival and perhaps
also important to account for 5-year survival,45, which would mean that British primary care
physicians are not referring enough patients to cancer screening services.46 Similarly, the
cost-containment role played by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence
Team Meetings: Where is the Value?" Lancet Oncology 7, no. 11 (2006): 886{888; Anne Fleissig et al., \Mul-
tidisciplinary Teams in Cancer Care: Are They Effective in the UK?" Lancet Oncology 7 (2006): 935{943.
45. See Mike Richards, \EUROCARE-4 Studies Bring New Data on Cancer Survival," Lancet Oncology 8,
no. 9 (2007): 752{753; Kathryn Senior, \Disparities in Cancer Survival and Cancer Care across Europe," Lancet
Oncology 10, no. 3 (2009): 214{215. Mike Richards especially has submitted a large amount of evidence in that
direction for several years, before and after being appointed as National Cancer Director.
46. Mike Richards, Improving Access to Medicines for NHS Patients: A Report for the Secretary of State for
Health (London: Department of Health, 2008).
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(NICE) might be called into question if drug availability is proven to be a determinant fac-
tor, as advanced by a recent and controversial comparative report.47 Finally, some defining
characteristics of cancer registration in Britain could mean that the UK is estimating cor-
rectly its survival rates while other countries are not: whereas the NHS runs a systematic
cancer registration system, not all countries do.48
If any bias could be traced to these different aspects of the UK health system, then
the EUROCARE study should have been treated with skepticism, in case it overlooked
or did not acknowledge them.49 Studies in organisation theory show that such cognitive
dissonance in organisational rankings is likely to entail hostility from organisationmembers:
if an identity characteristic of their organisation exists outside the ranking criteria, then the
metric of the ranking might be incorrect and the comparison critically flawed.50 And indeed,
skepticism was palpable in several discussions about the EUROCARE results for Britain.
The most detailed critique I have encountered appeared in the British Journal of Cancer: its
authors suggested that the UK and Scandinavian records were fine, while in other countries,
“survival [might have been] inflated in some registries because of failure to identify all
cases of advanced disease” – a critique dismissed the EUROCARE investigators.51 Identical
critiques were formulated after the publication of EUROCARE-3 and EUROCARE-4. Even
more recently, additional controversy has arisen in the context of the upcoming general
election, with senior figures from Cancer Research UK claiming: “In terms of survival
data, EUROCARE is the best we have but there have been concerns about how the data are
sometimes presented…What we are slightly concerned about is where people have tried to
present the data as a league table when there are these important caveats to consider—we
have to consider the data very carefully.”52
47. See Nils Wilking and Bengt Jonsson, A Pan-European Comparison regarding Patient Access to Cancer
Drugs (Stockholm: Karolinska Institutet, 2005), and Michel P. Coleman, \New Drugs and Survival: Does the
Karolinska Report Make Sense?" Cancer World (2006): 26{35 for a critique.
48. 9 of the 17 countries covered in EUROCARE-2 had less than 20% of their populations covered by their
registration systems – France, for instance, uses a small sample of its regional districts. I have witnessed public
health specialists complain about this during several symposia, as the sample is considered ‘hardly representa-
tive’ by some.
49. Only a few news stories decided to treat the EUROCARE under such careful assumptions; the best piece
in that respect was probably Nicholas Timmins’ account, “Health warnings are a little off colour,” Financial
Times, 8 December 1999.
50. Kimberly D. Elsbach and Roderick M. Kramer, \Members’ Responses to Organizational Identity Threats:
Encountering and Countering the BusinessWeek Rankings," Administrative Science Quarterly 41, no. 3 (1996):
442{476.
51. C. B. J. Woodman et al., \Are Differences in Stage at Presentation a Credible Explanation for Reported
Differences in the Survival of Patients with Colorectal Cancer in Europe?" British Journal of Cancer 85, no.
6 (2001): 787{790; Gemma Gatta, Riccardo Capocaccia, and Franco Berrino, \Cancer Survival Differences
Between European Populations: The UK Uneasiness," British Journal of Cancer 85, no. 6 (2001): 785{786.
Along with organization theorists, this technique of ‘counterpoint publication’ might be understood as a form of
defensive institutional work, in support of the NHS versus other health systems; see Steve Maguire and Cynthia
Hardy, \Discourse and Deinstitutionalization: The Decline of DDT," Academy of Management Journal 52, no.
1 (2009): 148{178.
52. EmmaWilkinson, \Questions Remain over Validity of EUROCARE Data," Lancet 374, no. 9694 (2009):
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As of today, then, the comparative validity of the EUROCARE study remains an open
question; recently, the very first page of the 2010 volume of the Lancet Oncology opened
on an editorial that stressed that “any comparisons with Europe should be done judiciously
because previous concerns about survival as a metric and the validity of comparing survival
between countries are still relevant”.53 One might sum up all these appeals to caution under
two labels: opposition to the findings on the grounds of mismeasure (comparing is inac-
curate), and/or on the grounds of idiosyncrasy (comparing is impossible). A third type of
opposition might also be identified among the health professionals who opposed the rank-
ings because of the gross exaggerations they had led to in public discourse, such as when
claims were made that British cancer patients were getting a “Third World service.”54
It would be wrong to say, however, that contrarian opinions about the EUROCARE re-
sults represented a majority of public statements, or resulted into the formation of a counter-
epistemic community.55 The majority of opinions expressed in the months following the
publication of the EUROCARE-2 study were indeed supportive of the results in one way
or another, and further encouraged the sweeping reforms rapidly introduced by the British
government in order to tackle the most critical aspects of the issue.
3.3 Blame avoidance and symbols of compliance
The poor health performance of the UK, illustrated by the EUROCARE-2 study and by
the general media coverage of British health care in 1999, was quickly followed by policy
responses at the governmental level. In order to avoid the blame, the British (English) exec-
utive started by spending large amounts of attention and money in the direction of the NHS,
and of cancer services in particular; it also sent significant signs of institutional compliance
with the conclusions of the EUROCARE study by adjusting several aspects of its health
system to address the potential causes of low cancer survival.
964. Cancer Research UK is the leading cancer charity in Britain; it was created bymerging the Cancer Research
Campaign and the Imperial Cancer Research Fund in 2002. Interestingly, then, data that were potentially useful
to some actors in 1999 are now pointed as ‘risky business’ by the same stakeholders.
53. Lancet Oncology, \More Woes for UK Cancer Services," Lancet Oncology 11, no. 1 (2010): 1. Another
recent word of caution was formulated by the IARC, which recently emphasised: “The reasons for survival
differences between countries… are complex. Improved survival may be due to greater awareness in the pop-
ulation, earlier diagnosis, or more effective treatment. In its next [fifth] phase, the EUROCARE project is
focusing on determining the extent to which differences and improvements in survival are the result of better
treatment, and to what extent the improved effectiveness of treatment is due to earlier diagnosis.” (IARC Press
Release 129, 22 September 2009).
54. Jeremy Laurance, “Cancer deaths in Britain ‘no worse than elsewhere’,” The Independent, 10 November
1999.
55. The latter notion is applied to HIV/AIDS in South Africa in Jeremy R. Youde, AIDS, South Africa, and
the Politics of Knowledge (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), ch. 3.
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Blame avoidance In modern health polities, diseases are not fate-induced and office-
holders do not hold thaumaturgic powers; instead, politicians are expected to pledge both
attention and money when bad but genuine news reports bring saliency to low or catastroph-
ically low quality of care within their health systems.
In May 1999, Downing Street launched its cancer effort by organising its own cancer
summit, with a press release announcing: “Tony Blair leads war on cancer”56 In February
2000, the strategy report at the heart of that effort was published as The NHS Cancer Plan,
which drew on previous initiatives and also prefigured the later National Service Frame-
works.57 At that time, Britain was not the only European state to show particular attention
to cancer; however, in other countries, the patterns of blame avoidance and credit-claiming
took different forms.58.
The main mechanism of blame avoidance was not, however, attention, but money. The
first budgetary act in response to the 1999 NHS crisis came in the form of a large envelope
was sent to health services during what is now referred to by observers as the most expen-
sive breakfast in history. On January 16, 2000, during an appearance on the ‘Breakfast with
Frost’ TV morning show, Tony Blair announced his government would bring the NHS up to
European average levels in terms of health expenditure within the next five years.59 At the
time of this announcement, the last rounds of EUROCARE-induced backlash were hitting
the UK in the form of negative OECD reports, which now emphasised the poor performance
of the NHS on cancer survival rates and waiting times rather than underlining, as it had a
few years before, its ‘remarkable’ cost-effectiveness.60 A second budgetary response then
56. Jeremy Laurance, “Blair launches war on cancer with tea and sympathy - but no more money,” The Inde-
pendent, 21 May 1999.
57. ThePlan indeed reinstated some principles of the Calman-Hine report, a report that had already underlined
some of the deficiencies of British cancer services; for that reason, and also because of the EUROCARE-1 results
in 1995, many clinical experts were already familiar with the picture drawn of theUKby the EUROCARE results
(as shown, for instance, by correspondence published in the British Medical Journal). Historical data on the
Calman-Hine report and the UK cancer control policy appear in Robert A Haward, \The Calman–Hine Report:
A Personal Retrospective on the Uk’s First Comprehensive Policy on Cancer Services," Lancet Oncology 7
(2006): 336{346 as well as in postgraduate research by Ellen van Reuler (University of Manchester, 2008) and
by myself (University of Edinburgh, 2007).
58. In the case of the UK, the ‘blame’ element was predominant, while the French narrative shows more
balance between credit and blame. I thank Theodore Marmor for a useful discussion over this matter. Details
on the various patterns of blame and credit, as well as the material and symbolic dimensions of office-seeking
and office-keeping, appear in a previous paper delivered to the University of Edinburgh Policy Research Group,
February 2008, and to the Postgraduate Northern Conference, Edinburgh, June 2008, alongwith a light empirical
treatment of the EUROCARE narrative in England and elements on the French case study.
59. The announcement followed the publication of a disastrous NHS failure by Lord Winston in the New
Statesman and was apparently not exactly well-planned, coming as a surprise to at least some of top policy
advisers and members of the Cabinet; the announcement itself did, for example, infuriate Gordon Brown. First-
hand evidence appears in Smee, Speaking Truth to Power, 24-25 and Dean, \Media Fingers in the Social Policy
Pie – and the Seven Sins of the Reptiles." Former adviser Simon Stevens has also acknowledged the critical
influence of the Mavis Skeet scandal in Blair’s decision; see Nicholas Timmins, Rejuvenate or Retire? View of
the NHS at 60 (London: Nuffield Trust, 2008), 108.
60. Smee, Speaking Truth to Power, 25. Negative OECD reports must have had particular impact within the
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came with the publication NHS Cancer Plan, which had been initially criticised for being
financially toothless.61 The Plan indeed came with ring-fenced funding for cancer services,
as well as with a long-term funding architecture that made sure cancer services would con-
tinue to benefit from renewed budget allowances in the future (a task now picked up by the
Cancer Reform Strategy, issued in 2007). Finally, a third budgetary act appeared in July
1999 with health secretary Frank Dobson’s announcement of the Saving Lives: Our Health-
ier Nation white paper, which materialised the ‘Breakfast with Frost’ promise by pledging
an additional $96 million budget for the NHS.62
Symbols of compliance Attention and budgets were completed by important signs
of institutional compliance with the conclusions of the EUROCARE-2 study. As Steven
Epstein has observed, “organisations often respond to external pressure by creating formal
structures (offices, positions, rules, programs, and procedures) precisely ‘to create visible
symbols of compliance’ that they can show off. But to say that compliance is ‘symbolic’
is not to say it is ‘merely’ symbolic. Even if the organisation appears to prize formalism
over substance, the outcome may still be one of meaningful social change.”63 At least three
important symbols are identifiable following the publication of the EUROCARE results and
interrelated NHS crisis.
The first and foremost symbol of compliance with the EUROCARE study was the ap-
pointment of Professor Mike Richards as National Cancer Director, or ‘cancer czar.’ The
creation of such a position has given tremendous autonomy to cancer control as a subcom-
ponent of health policy within the general policy environment of the NHS. Interestingly,
one of the first initiatives carried by Richards was to convene a workshop to debate whether
the EUROCARE results were indeed valid.
A second symbol of compliance was targets. By introducing quantified objectives in the
NHS Cancer Plan and the Saving Lives white paper, both Downing Street and the Depart-
ment of Health found a way to respond to the initial scandal triggered by the EUROCARE
results: “Shamed by statistics that show Britain has one of the worst cancer survival rates
in the developed world, the Government… introduced a ten-year action plan to cut deaths
from the disease in those under 75 by a fifth over the next decade.”64 The publication of
UK government since both organisations were used to having what has been described as a relationship based
on ‘mutual admiration’ (Nick Manning, \Mutual Admiration? OECD Advice to the UK," in The OECD and
European Welfare States (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004), 197{210).
61. Jeremy Laurance, “Blair launches war on cancer with tea and sympathy - but no more money,” The Inde-
pendent, 21 May 1999; see also the Independent’s editorial on that same day, “It takes more than fine words to
defeat cancer.”
62. Cherry Norton, “Dobson launches health ‘crusade’,” The Independent, 7 July 1999.
63. Steven Epstein, Inclusion. The Politics of Difference inMedical Research (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2007), 171-172.
64. Ian Murray, “Blair plan aims to cut cancer deaths by fifth,” The Times, 21 May 1999.
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these targets is retrospectively unsurprising, as New Labour has proven a great follower
of its Conservative predecessors in adopting managerial techniques focused on outcomes
rather than inputs.65 However, the specific attention paid to cancer in that reform exercise
shows that, at that stage, the NHS had reconstructed its own identity in congruence with the
international standards introduced by the EUROCARE study. The congruence of cancer as
a benchmark for NHS policy and politics was further reinforced after the Cabinet change of
October 1999, in which Alan Milburn replaced Frank Dobson (who was then running for
mayor in London); in the footsteps of Dobson’s “health crusade,” Milburn announced that
his own approach to health policy would focus on cancer and heart disease.66
A final symbol of institutional compliance with the EUROCARE results and discussions
lies with drug availability under the NHS. Following a long and complex policy narrative,
which includes the Herceptin episode of 2005 and more recent controversies over, inter alia,
other cancer drugs, the British government is now considering ‘top-ups’ within the NHS, in
order to allow patients to access drugs that have not passed the cost-effectiveness tests set
up by NICE. Recent policy developments, addressed in the Richards report of 2008,67 hence
show that the issue raised by the EUROCARE study with regards to the low availability of
cancer drugs within the NHS is still being processed. Final decisions on that issue might
have crucial implications for the NHS, as it might modify its foundational principle of equal
care to all.68
The sum-total of these changes is impressive, and spans way beyond the current, and
probably even future, EU mandate on health; however, all these reforms can be traced to
the 1999 episode of NHS crisis, in which the EU was instrumental by providing the British
health polity with the EUROCARE results, which epitomised the most controversial aspects
of health policy in Britain. I now consider what could be the theoretical underpinnings for
this phenomenon.
65. Klein, The New Politics of the NHS. From Creation to Reinvention, 192; Florence Faucher-King and
Patrick Le Gales, Tony Blair 1997-2007, le temps des reformes (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2007). Health
targets are still being used today, and even though the Conservative Party is threatening to scrap (some of) them
if they win the next election, their alternative concept of ‘process-based’ indicators (introduced in a green paper
on health in 2008) does not hint at any substantive deviation from the path set in the last decades.
66. David Hughes, “Milburn wages war on cancer and coronaries,” The Daily Mail, 18 October 1999.
67. Richards, Improving Access to Medicines for NHS Patients: A Report for the Secretary of State for Health.
68. Albert Weale and Sarah Clark, \Co-Payments in the NHS: An Analysis of the Normative Arguments,"
Health Economics, Policy and Law 5, no. 2 (2010): 225{246.
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4 Analytical framework
4.1 Review of theoretical options
The current sociological literature offers at least three promising options to theorise the
effects of the EUROCARE study on British cancer (and health) policy. I review each option
separately, and will discard the first one while drawing on the latter two, as well as on
recent work on measurement and distributive politics, in order to submit a final theoretical
proposition on what might be termed the ‘disciplinary acts of EU comparison’ illustrated by
the EUROCARE case study.
Performativity Drawing on the work of John L. Austin, several authors have explored
performativity as a social mechanism in which discourse produces the phenomena that it
regulates and constrains. Having considered if the effects of the EUROCARE study could
be said to be of performative nature, this option seems implausible: the survival data col-
lected by the EUROCARE group are not an arbitrary convention that cannot be related to
any ex ante truth, and its publication (which would count as a speech utterance in Austin’s
performativity theory) is unlikely to have had performative (self-fulfilling) effects on the
concerned health systems ex post (i.e. the EUROCARE study did not in itself lead to varia-
tions in cancer survival in the countries it surveyed: talking of ‘poor cancer survival rates’ is
unlikely to impoverish cancer survival).69). In Donald MacKenzie’s words, performativity
applies to social objects, such as theories or models, that affect social reality by functioning
as engines rather than cameras,70 whereas the EUROCARE study is clearly fits in the later
category.
Legibility Another theoretical option comes from James Scott’s stimulating account
of how pre-modern agrarian authorities, and later modern European states, were faced with
the daunting task of rendering their subjects (and territory) legible to the state, insofar as
“the legibility of a society provides the capacity for large-scale social engineering.”71 To
the modern state, the task of identifying the state of health of its population is different only
in degree, not in nature, and it remains a complex mission of the state than to establish how
healthy its subjects actually are, and why so. Acquiring information on the scope, causes
69. That is the case because system-level trust has extremely limited effects on system-level performance in
health systems as opposed to, e.g, financial market systems. There is no observable Matthew effect in cancer
survival rates after the publication of the EUROCARE study.
70. Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets, MIT Press (Cam-
bridge: MIT Press, 2008).
71. James C. Scott, Seeing like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 5. Daniel Little’s reading of Scott’s work has been of invaluable
help, such as his parallel between Scott’s and Popper’s analyses of large-scale social engineering.
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and impact of death and disease within a given nation has led to registration technologies and
counting practices that stand as functional equivalents to the machinery deployed in modern
polities to collect taxes, conscript soldiers and prevent rebellion. Several other studies offer
in-depth histories of the joint production of state power and the knowledge apparatus of de-
mography, epidemiology and public health ‘vital’ statistics72. In that respect, the science of
counting cancer deaths and cases, as well as the practice of classifying them into complex,
involuted categories of tumours73 is a demanding mission that has resulted into the devel-
opment of situated, locally tailored epistemic cultures, still only imperfectly standardised
through the application of IARC protocols). Cancer registration and quantification echoes
James Scott’s observation that “[m]uch of early modern European statecraft [was] devoted
to rationalising and standardising what was a social hieroglyph into a legible and adminis-
tratively more convenient format.”74 Not only then does Scott’s theory of ‘legibility to the
state’ fit the data exposed in this case study; it also describes quite gracefully the enterprise
of the EUROCARE epistemic community.
Discipline There is more than legibility to EUROCARE, though: as explained earlier,
comparative data that can be understood as a ranking not only sheds light on the predica-
ment of nation-states, but also makes some of them look performant or not depending on
their positional status; this image, in turn, generates reactions of pride or hostility. Several
aspects of Wendy Espeland et al.’s sociology of quantification are useful to better formalise
the processes at play in the interpretation and effects of rankings on organizations.75 First
of all, as observed through the use of the EUROCARE results by several members of the
UK health policy community, commensuration “offers standardised ways of constructing
72. Important works in that strand of literature include Alain Desrosieres, La politique des grands nombres :
histoire de la raison statistique (Paris: La Decouverte, 1993); Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers : The Pur-
suit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) and Libby Schweber,
Disciplining Statistics: Demography and Vital Statistics in France and England, 1830-1885 (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2006). On the more specific topic of cancer epidemiology in the second half of the twentieth
century, see the chapter by the late Richard Doll in Walter W. Holland, Jrn Olsen, and Charles du V. Flo-
rey, eds., The Development of Modern Epidemiology. Personal Reports from Those who Were There (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007).
73. Solid neoplasms represent roughly 100 entries in the current edition of the International Classification of
Diseases (ICD-10).
74. Scott, Seeing like a State, 2-3. With reference to Scott’s work, the modern maps of cancer incidence
over continents (such as the GLOBOCAN project run by the IARC) or countries epitomise his theory of the
power/knowledge nexus as a modest and limited enterprise in previous centuries, which have now turned into a
high-modernist project that spans over several other aspects of social life, such as agriculture or urban planning,
and which ultimately aims at increased control over nature (ibid., 89).
75. Wendy N. Espeland and Mitchell L. Stevens, \Commensuration as a Social Process," Annual Review
of Sociology 24 (1998): 313{343; Wendy N. Espeland and Michael Sauder, \Rankings and Reactivity: How
Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds," American Journal of Sociology 113, no. 1 (2007): 1{40; Michael
Sauder and Wendy N. Espeland, \The Discipline of Rankings: Tight Coupling and Organizational Change,"
American Sociological Review 74 (2009): 63{82; Wendy N. Espeland and Mitchell L. Stevens, \A Sociology
of Quantification," Archives Europeennes de Sociologie/European Journal of Sociology 49, no. 3 (2009): 401{
436.
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proxies for uncertain and elusive qualities [and] condenses and reduces the amount of infor-
mation people have to process, [thereby] simplifying decision-making.”.76 Then, the three
effects defined as reactivity in Espeland’s explanatory framework are also relevant to the
present case study, as “the redistribution of resources, redefinition of work, and proliferation
of gaming [blame-avoiding] strategies”77 are all observable at various steps of the empiri-
cal narrative. Finally, and most importantly, Espeland has offered an analysis of rankings
as a specific incarnation of disciplinary power, inspired from Michel Foucault’s analysis
of the concept. In her framework, “surveillance and normalization facilitate a discipline
that is both imposed by outsiders and internalized by insiders.”78 As disciplinary practices
embed prescription and codification in seemingly mundane aspects of one’s conduct, they
contribute to the internalization of coercion through specific techniques, of which rankings
are a particular instance.79 All these elements are immediately transposable to the analy-
sis of the EUROCARE case study: by setting up a cross-national surveillance apparatus
of cancer survival, the epistemic community behind the EUROCARE studies has success-
fully introduced its own codes and practices of measurement within governmental practice,
encouraging the adoption of benchmarks or targets and the close monitoring of epidemio-
logical data as a means to probe for the effectiveness of the health system overall.80
Based on the EUROCARE case study, my theoretical proposition offers, then, to connect
the two aforementioned phenomena of legibility and discipline (performativity having been
discarded) with a third component, that will allow to understand rankings as an instrument
of policy change.
4.2 Theoretical proposition
In a recent article, Anthony Bertelli and Peter John have set an interesting agenda for the
study of performance measurements. Their main claim is that these initiatives, which in-
clude ratings of public services, represent “a political discipline mechanism, and constitute
an increasingly powerful dimension of distributive politics,” insofar as they “provide qual-
itative judgments about organisations with an electoral connection [and] provide a mecha-
nism for voters to assess the policy responsiveness of their incumbents.”81 Their tentative
76. Espeland and Stevens, \Commensuration as a Social Process," 316.
77. Espeland and Sauder, \Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds," 3.
78. Sauder and Espeland, \The Discipline of Rankings: Tight Coupling and Organizational Change," 68.
79. Ibid., 69.
80. Targets and outcome-based assessments, of crouse, carry their own limitations: “Whenever abstract po-
litical goals are translated into concrete numerical targets, there is always the risk that ‘formal rationality’ will
swamp “substantive rationality”—that is, the emphasis on systematisation and measurement will become more
salient than the achievement of the original policy objectives. In such cases, procedural standards become ends
in themselves, rather than means to an end.” (Epstein, Inclusion, 171).
81. Anthony M. Bertelli and Peter John, \Government Checking Government: How Performance Measures
Expand Distributive Politics," Journal of Politics 72, no. 2 (2010): 545.
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theory links these performance measurements, which usually stand for “technocratic deci-
sion making” (a depoliticised way to solve policy coordination problems) with a distributive
approach to politics, which they test at the level of English local government. While the
modelling part of their inquiry is itself interesting, their conclusion is sufficiently straight-
forward to inform the current case study: even when “performance regimes rest under the
auspices of scientific measurement and agency independence… [they are] often instrumen-
tal to the distribution of resources.”82 The EUROCARE study carries the same teaching:
in the long run, the scientific agenda (or ‘knowledge initiative’) pursued by the European
Union through its funding to the EUROCARE project had diffracted distributive effects
within the British health polity. The temporal stretch of that effect is considerable, if one
considers the initial setup of the Europe Against Cancer action programme in the mid-1980s
and the consequences of the EUROCARE-2 study on British health policy in the late 1990s;
nevertheless, there is a clear link in the narrative previously offered between the compilation
of scientific data at the European level (and with financial support from EU institutions) and
significant distributive acts of government in the UK. The ‘political discipline mechanism’
illustrated by this link followed a much more haphazard and accidental logic than the one
hypothesised by Bertelli and John, yet the materialisation of health system performance into
the EUROCARE cancer survival data and their further interpretation as rankings or ‘league
tables’ did occur and participate into enabling important policy change, both in the form of
resource deployment and institutional reform.
What I would then like to submit to theoretical scrutiny is a cumulation of the heuris-
tics offered by legibility, discipline and distributive politics as understood in the previous
paragraphs, in order to form what might be named, in the context of the European Union, a
disciplinary act of EU comparison, which is, I believe, a common but under-theorised form
of Europeanization born in the will to inform, but also to compare and eventually coerce
Member States into adopting adjustment procedures that aim at bringing the performance of
their policy environments at acceptable levels, usually defined as the ‘EU average,’ through
reallocation of resources and further institutional reforms. The multiplication of such dis-
ciplinary acts of comparison has endowed the European Union with what I believe to be
an effective and discrete policy instrument in the health care policy domain, strong of its
enrolment of scientific authorities, and capable of reaching beyond the formal EU mandate
deep into the core principles of health systems. Such disciplinary acts of comparison are
also routinely observable in other fora, such as the OECD, which comes as no surprise, es-
pecially in a sector such as health care where the OECD has secured an influential position
by becoming the most authoritative source of comparative data.83 The EUROCARE case
study shows, however, that disciplinary acts of EU comparison might be more efficient than
other disciplinary acts from supranational organisations by invitingMember States to search
82. Ibid., 556.
83. Patrick Hassenteufel et al., \La liberalisation des systemes de protectionmaladie europeens. Convergence,
europeanisation et adaptations nationales," Politique europeenne, no. 2 (2000): 33{46.
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for the flaws within their own systems and adopting endogenous reforms, as was the case
in Britain, rather than by importing a one-size-fits-all policy model crafted outside of their
political control.
At the price, perhaps, of oversimplification and excessive abstraction, I would sum up
the characteristics of disciplinary acts of comparison carried by epistemic communities such
as the one behind the EUROCARE study as follows: (1) these acts are normatively inclined
towards the acquisition of knowledge and the dissemination of information as legitimate,
pursuable goals; (2) when brought to a given policy environment, these acts are then sus-
ceptible to alter the preference sets of the policy community, as they provide both argumen-
tative devices and internal motives for modifying the status quo towards a more favourable
distribution of resources; and finally, (3) these acts are likely to bring endogenous reform
at the institutional level when the affected actors within the policy community include the
range of critical decision-makers invested with the necessary authority to bypass veto play-
ers and enforce policy change. In less abstract terms, these acts designate the translation of
ideas crafted by an epistemic community into new interests with regards to the allocation
of public goods; that translation process can be expected to have substantive effects on the
institutional environment if and only if their disciplinary power also affects the minimum
winning coalition of decision-makers in a given policy environment.
5 Conclusion
The EUROCARE study had a decisive impact on the UK, and has affected more than one
health polity; Denmark, but also countries with comparatively high cancer survival rates,
pay a lot of attention to its results. In France, the results of the study did not turn into newspa-
per stories, but health professionals are very well aware of them andwill use them to confirm
that the French health system is treating cancer patients rather well. The EUROCARE study
is cited in recent policy reports, such as the Grunfeld report of 2009, and appears in several
documents issued by the French National Cancer Institute (INCa). When candidly asked
if they use the EUROCARE data in their policy assessments, officials swiftly respond that
they “naturally” do so, and that they pay “extra attention” to all EUROCARE publications.84
Even well-performing states show signs of discipline, which suggests that the EUROCARE
has become a routinised and durable ‘obligatory passage point’ for cancer policy-making,
regardless of its results.85 Finally, the influence of EUROCARE on supranational advocacy
is also remarkable: the study has provided multiple cancer-specific epistemic communities
84. I recently asked the question to the director of the National Cancer Institute in a public meeting (5th
Parliamentary Meetings on Cancer, Paris, 6 April 2010).
85. The notion of ‘obligatory passage points’ appears in Michel Callon’s sociology of science to explain
how some technical devices become mandatory elements of scientific demonstrations. The EUROCARE study
clearly fits in that category, as it has become an enduring component of policy assessment throughout the years.
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(such as ECCO, the European Cancer Organisation, created in 2007) with valuable data, and
has even provided the impetus for the formation of at least one major transnational advocacy
group, breast cancer coalition Europa Donna.86
The EUROCARE study was also particularly effective because, tacitly, health systems
are currently competing with each other, despite no formal obligation to do so. Following
the path of OECD comparisons and performance indicators, European regulations are fram-
ing the European policy space as a field of heteronomous institutions where national solu-
tions strive and compete for autonomy. Even if the EU does not claim any sovereignty over
health systems, it has clearly deployed enough efforts in that direction for agents within these
systems to feel somewhat threatened by EU law, to various degrees.87 As a consequence,
the framing of a Member State as a ‘Champion’ or as a ‘Laggard’ is no more constrained
to a restricted set of economic performance indicators, but has spanned to several public
services. This trend should be expected to expand, both horizontally, as an increasing num-
ber of policies are perceived as apt candidates for EU comparisons, and vertically, as these
comparisons reach deeper characteristics of each policy domain. The EUROCARE study il-
lustrates both horizontal and vertical expansion of these disciplinary acts of EU comparison,
as it shows how health, and within health, cancer performance, can affect policy-making at
the domestic level.
The generalisation of the EUROCARE case study across different ‘disease cases’ is de-
pendent upon at least three factors: first, data availability and research efforts might be more
advanced for cancer as compared to other diseases; second, attention to cancer (survival) is
likely to be superior, to some extent, to survival rates for other conditions; and finally, varia-
tions in survival (or any other measure used as performance) might be less obvious for other
pathologies. Notwithstanding these conditional statements, it seems very plausible that the
processes illustrated by the effects of the EUROCARE study in England will occur in dif-
ferent disease areas, perhaps with less saliency and less dramatic effects effects on disease
control policies. This form of Europeanization of health system performance might set out
an interesting agenda for health and EU scholars alike, and especially for those interested
in acts of governments situated within the knowledge/power nexus.
86. Mona Okasha, \Including Breast Cancer in the Political Agenda," Lancet Oncology 2, no. 1 (2001): 62.
87. Greer, The Politics of European Union Health Policies.
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